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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
In the Matter of Oshun Cyrus Hinton, Deceased. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000774 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel (ODC) has filed a petition advising the Court 
that Oshun Cyrus Hinton, Esquire, passed away on April 12, 2015, and requesting 
the appointment of Carl L. Solomon, Esquire, as Special Receiver to protect the 
interests of Mr. Hinton's clients pursuant to Rule 31 of the Rules for Lawyer 
Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate 
Court Rules (SCACR). In addition, ODC requests that the Court appoint Vanessa 
Cason, Esquire, to assist Mr. Solomon.  The petition is granted. 
IT IS ORDERED that Carl L. Solomon, Esquire, is hereby appointed to assume 
responsibility for Mr. Hinton's client files, trust account(s), escrow account(s), 
operating account(s), and any other law office account(s) Mr. Hinton maintained. 
Mr. Solomon shall take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, 
to protect the interests of Mr. Hinton's clients.  Mr. Solomon may make 
disbursements from Mr. Hinton's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office account(s) Mr. Hinton maintained that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment.   
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating accounts of Mr. Hinton, shall serve as notice to the 
bank or other financial institution that Carl L. Solomon, Esquire, has been duly 
appointed by this Court. 
This Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, shall 
serve as notice that Carl L. Solomon, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this 
Court and has the authority to receive Mr. Hinton's mail and the authority to direct 
that Mr. Hinton’s mail be delivered to Mr. Solomon's office. 
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Finally, the Court appoints Vanessa Cason, Esquire, to assist the Special Receiver 
in performing the duties imposed by Rule 31, RLDE.   
These appointments shall be for a period of no longer than nine months unless 
request is made to this Court for an extension.       
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 FOR THE COURT 
 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
April 14, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

The State, Respondent, 
  
v. 
 
Derrick McDonald, Petitioner. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213686 
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS 
Appeal from Kershaw County 
G. Thomas Cooper, Jr., Circuit Court Judge  
Opinion No. 27515 

Heard December 11, 2014 – Filed April 22, 2015 

AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED 
Chief Appellate Defender Robert M. Dudek, of 
Columbia, for Petitioner. 
Attorney General Alan M. Wilson, Chief Deputy 
Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Senior Assistant 
Deputy Attorney General Donald J. Zelenka, Senior 
Assistant Attorney General Melody J. Brown, and 
Solicitor Daniel E. Johnson, all of Columbia, for 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE: Petitioner Derrick McDonald and two codefendants 
were convicted of murder and first-degree burglary.  The court of appeals affirmed, 
rejecting McDonald's argument that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated 
when the trial court admitted the redacted confession of one of his nontestifying 
codefendants. We granted a writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' 
decision in State v. McDonald, 400 S.C. 272, 734 S.E.2d 167 (Ct. App. 2012).  We 
find the court of appeals erred, for the jury would readily infer from the face of the 
codefendant's confession that it referred to and incriminated McDonald.  We 
nevertheless affirm McDonald's conviction, for the error was harmless in light of 
the overwhelming evidence of guilt.
I. 
McDonald, Christopher Whitehead, Robert Cannon and Joshua Zoch (Victim)
worked together at various times at a Sonic fast food restaurant in Columbia, South 
Carolina. On the evening of December 12, 2006, Victim was brutally murdered in 
his Kershaw County home.  McDonald, Whitehead, and Cannon were charged, 
tried together, and convicted of burglarizing Victim's home and murdering him.
Earlier on the day of the murder, Whitehead called a co-worker looking for Victim.  
Whitehead wanted to know if Victim would be home that evening.  According to 
the co-worker, Whitehead wanted to go over to Victim's home to fight him.  
Whitehead was upset because he believed Victim was a "snitch" who was
cooperating with the police in various drug investigations.
At approximately 10:00 in the evening, Whitehead, McDonald and Cannon arrived 
together at Sonic in Whitehead's car. Cannon was wearing a ski mask, and the 
assistant manager on duty told all three men to leave the premises.  The trio left 
Sonic together in Whitehead's car and drove to a Wal-Mart, where they purchased 
a ski mask and latex gloves. 
Victim's brutally beaten body was discovered in his home the next day by his 
girlfriend. Victim was beaten to death by multiple objects.  The forensic 
pathologist testified that he identified between six and eight injuries to Victim's
head that were each independently capable of causing death. 
13
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The investigation quickly focused on Whitehead, McDonald, and Cannon 
(Defendants). Investigators spoke to Cannon, who gave a detailed confession 
implicating all of the Defendants in Victim's murder.  Following Cannon's
confession, McDonald and Whitehead were arrested.  McDonald also confessed 
and admitted that the Defendants, after going to Wal-Mart, drove to Victim's home 
and broke in and killed him.  Defendants punched and kicked Victim repeatedly 
and hit him with a baseball bat and a lamp.  
II. 
Defendants were indicted on charges of first-degree burglary and murder.  The 
State chose to try the Defendants jointly and sought to introduce McDonald's and 
Cannon's confessions during its case-in-chief.  Defense counsel and the State 
argued about how the confessions should be redacted in order to comply with the 
Confrontation Clause. The State contended redacting the confessions using the 
neutral phrase "another person" was sufficient, while defense counsel insisted on 
redacting all references to anyone other than the confessing defendant in each of 
the statements. The trial court overruled defense counsel's objections and 
instructed the State to redact the confessions using the phrase "another person."  
The confessions were admitted over counsel's objection.  
According to Cannon's statement, with "another person" substituted for the names 
of the codefendants: 
On Tuesday the 12th December 2006 at 2:00 p.m. another person got 
off of work and picks me up.  We go to the mall and I got a new cell 
phone and shoes. We then went to pick up another person and then 
we went to McDonalds in Blythwood and eat and from there we went 
to Sonic. I had on a ski mask and was joking around while another 
person talked to a girl in the back and another person was talking to 
Leroy. I don't know Leroys last name.  We then left Sonic and went 
to the Two Notch Walmart and and another person got a ski mask. 
So we went riding and another person said you know we need to do 
something with these mask, and I ask and another person ask like 
what. And another person said like beat Josh's ass because he's a 
snitch, and I told another person I didn't think he was a snitch.  
Another person then ask if me and another person wanted to ride and 
we said whatever. 
14
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
Because I had nothing else to do and no certain time to be home, that 
was about 11 p.m. Another person was real quiet in the car while we 
were going to Josh's house.  We pulled up to Josh's about 11:30 p.m. 
another person knocked on the front door and Josh didn't answer.  So 
another person said that he was going to pull one of my moves and 
kick the door. So another person went to the side door and he 
another person busted it in. 
He went in first and me and another person followed him to watch the 
fight. Josh was asleep on the couch and another person yelled hey 
bitch, and when Josh looked up, another person hit him with a glass 
lamp.  Right after that Josh was in a daze and another person drags 
him off the couch part of the way.  Then another person started 
pressuring another person to hit Josh with the bat that was in the 
house and another person then hit Josh in the back of head.  After that 
Josh was basicly crawling trying to get up, and the whole time 
another person was talking shit to him about being a snitch.  At that 
time another person kicked Josh in the ribs and ask Josh where the 
weed was and Josh was just grunting.  That when another person ask 
me to check the room and we started pulling draws and another 
person flipped the mattress and another person was just standing 
their. Then Josh went unconscious and I got Josh a towel and put it to 
his head. Another person said fuck we don't have anything and 
pushed the Christmas tree over on Josh.  Another person then got mad 
again and took the house phone.  But before another person left he got 
some frozen chicken from the freezer and put it on Josh's head to try 
and stop the bleeding.  After that we went back out the same way we 
came in. 
We left and another person dropped another person off 1st and me 
second and I guess he went home. 
Q: Did you, another person, and another person have on gloves? 
A: Yes. 
Q: What kind of gloves?  
A: Purple latex and I had on 2 pair white and purple ones on top. 
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Q: Where was the bat from that was used to hit Josh? 
A: It was in Josh's house.  I just looked over their and another person 
picked it up. 
 
Q: What were you, another person, and another person wearing that 
night? 
A: Black pants and shirts and ski mask. 
 
Q: What color was the ski mask? 
A: Mine was black and theirs was black or dark blue. 
 
Q: Did you change cloths that night after the incident? 
A: Yes and another person done something with them.  
 
No defendant testified. 
 
The jury found Defendants guilty of both charges.  McDonald appealed,1  
contending that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated by the admission of 
Cannon's redacted confession, arguing that given the context, Cannon's written 
confession clearly implicated McDonald in the crimes.  The court of appeals 
affirmed, "find[ing] that the neutral phrase 'another person' inserted into Cannon's 
statement avoided any [Confrontation Clause] violation."2   State v. McDonald, 400 
S.C. at 279, 734 S.E.2d at 170.  We now review the court of appeals' Confrontation 
Clause determination. 
  
                                        
 
 
 
1 Whitehead also raised a Confrontation Clause challenge on appeal, and the court 
of appeals affirmed his conviction in an unpublished opinion.  State v. Whitehead, 
Op. No. 2012-UP-526 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Sept. 12, 2012).  This Court granted a 
writ of certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.
2 McDonald also argued in the court of appeals that the admission of Cannon's 
statement violated Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). The court of 
appeals held that issue to be unpreserved. State v. McDonald, 400 S.C. at 279–80,
734 S.E.2d at 171. This Court denied certiorari as to the Crawford issue. 
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III. 

"The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, extended against the States 
by the Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of a criminal defendant 'to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.'" Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 
206 (1987) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VI).  This constitutional right "include[s]
the right to cross-examine those witnesses." Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 401 
(1965). In Bruton v. United States, the United States Supreme Court held that a 
defendant's Confrontation Clause rights are violated when a nontestifying 
codefendant's confession that implicates the defendant is admitted during a joint 
trial. 391 U.S. 123, 127–28 (1968). The Court noted that these "powerfully 
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant" are not only "devastating 
to the defendant but [also] their credibility is inevitably suspect."  Id. at 135–136. 
"While appearing to establish a bright-line rule against the admission of a 
codefendant's confession which incriminates a defendant, the [Bruton] Court 
acknowledged there are alternatives which may allow the admission of a 
confession while still protecting a defendant's Confrontation Clause rights and in a 
footnote, mentioned redaction as one of those alternatives."  State v. Henson, 407 
S.C. 154, 162, 754 S.E.2d 508, 512 (2014) (citing Bruton, 391 U.S. at 133–34. 134 
n.10).
The Supreme Court has revisited the issue twice since Bruton. In Richardson v. 
Marsh, the Court addressed the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause is 
violated "when the codefendant's confession is redacted to omit any reference to 
the defendant, but the defendant is nonetheless linked to the confession by 
evidence properly admitted against him at trial."  481 U.S. 200, 202 (1987). The 
Court held that there was no Confrontation Clause violation "by the admission of a 
nontestifying codefendant's confession with a proper limiting instruction" when 
"the confession is redacted to eliminate not only the defendant's name, but any 
reference to his or her existence." Id. at 211. The Court expressly declined to 
opine "on the admissibility of a confession in which the defendant's name has been
replaced with a symbol or neutral pronoun."  Id. at 211 n.5. 
Eleven years later, the Supreme Court reached that issue in Gray v. Maryland, 523 
U.S. 185 (1998). The defendant's name in Gray was redacted by using the word 
"deleted" or inserting a blank space, and the Court found that "redaction that 
replaces a defendant's name with an obvious indication of deletion, such as a blank 
17
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
space, the word 'deleted,' or a similar symbol, still falls within Bruton's protective 
rule" as it "refers directly to the 'existence' of the nonconfessing codefendant."  Id. 
at 192. The Court noted that "the obvious deletion may well call the jurors'
attention specially to the removed name."  Id. at 193. "By encouraging the jury to 
speculate about the reference, the redaction may overemphasize the importance of 
the confession's accusation—once the jurors work out the reference."  Id. "In other 
words, the Court brought within Bruton's prohibition those confessions which 
facially incriminate through inference." Henson, 407 S.C. at 164, 754 S.E.2d at 
513.
This Court has followed Gray. First, in State v. Holder, the Court held that the 
admission of a nontestifying codefendant's oral statement which replaced the 
defendant's name with "she" violated the Confrontation Clause "because the jury 
could readily determine that the statement referred to [defendant] as she was the 
only female defendant."  382 S.C. 278, 285, 676 S.E.2d 690, 694 (2009).  More 
recently, in Henson, we found that the State's use of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession that replaced defendant's name with "the guy," "he," and "him" violated 
the Confrontation Clause because "the jury could infer from the face of 
[nontestifying codefendant's] confession without relying on any other evidence, 
that the confession referred to and incriminated [the defendant.]"  407 S.C. at 166, 
754 S.E.2d at 514. 
In the instant case, Cannon's confession was redacted using the phrase "another 
person." However, even a casual reading of the confession makes it apparent that 
the confession describes the actions of Cannon and two other male individuals.  
For example, Cannon's confession begins:  "On Tuesday the 12th December [sic] 
2006 at 2:00 p.m. another person got off of work and picks [sic] me up. We go 
[sic] to the mall and I got a new cell phone and shoes.  We then went to pick up 
another person . . . ." Moreover, the redacted version of Cannon's statement 
repeatedly uses the pronouns "he" and "him," clearly indicating that the unnamed 
individuals in the confession were male.  In light of the fact that there were three 
male defendants in the trial, the jury was left with the inescapable conclusion that 
Cannon's confession referred to McDonald and Whitehead, who were seated at 
counsel table.3  Under Bruton and its progeny, this is insufficient to satisfy the 
3 We also note that immediately after the investigator read Cannon's confession to 
the jury, the solicitor asked, "What happened next in the investigation?  What did 
you do next?"  The investigator responded, "After obtaining [Cannon's] statement, 
18
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                                                             
demands of the Confrontation Clause.  See Gray, 523 U.S. at 196 ("The inferences 
at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to 
someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury 
ordinarily could make immediately . . . ."); Henson, 407 S.C. at 164, 754 S.E.2d at 
513 (stating that Bruton prohibits statements "which facially incriminate through 
inference"). 
Moreover, we reject the State's invitation to find no Confrontation Clause violation 
based on the trial court's limiting instruction.  The presence of a limiting 
instruction is not curative here, as it was not in Bruton, for "there are some contexts 
in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, 
and the consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and 
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored."  Bruton, 391 U.S. at 135 
(citations omitted).  We hold that the court of appeals erred in finding that the 
admission of Cannon's redacted confession did not violate McDonald's
Confrontation Clause rights. 
"The mere finding of a violation of [the Confrontation Clause] in the course of the 
trial, however, does not automatically require reversal of the ensuing criminal 
conviction." Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430 (1972). "In some cases the 
properly admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prejudicial effect 
of the codefendant's admission is so insignificant by comparison, that it is clear 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the improper use of the admission was harmless 
error." Id. In this case, we find that the overwhelming evidence of McDonald's 
guilt renders the error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
We first note the presence of strong evidence of guilt, apart from the erroneous 
admission of Cannon's confession.  On the evening of the murder, Whitehead 
informed a co-worker that he intended to go over to Victim's home to fight him.
Later that evening, around 10:00 p.m., Defendants arrived at the Sonic, with 
Cannon donning a ski mask.  The shift manager told the Defendants to leave.  An 
on-duty employee then observed Defendants leave together.  That employee 
testified that Whitehead drove a four-door sedan with a noticeably loud muffler 
sound. Investigators obtained a receipt from the Wal-Mart on Two Notch Road in 
Columbia, which confirmed that a ski mask and purple latex gloves were 
we then obtained an arrest warrant for Mr. Derrick McDonald."  The inescapable 
conclusion is that Cannon's statement inculpated McDonald.   
19
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                        
purchased at 10:43 p.m. on the night of the murder.  At approximately 11:30 p.m., 
near the time of Victim's murder, Victim's neighbor took his dog outside and heard 
"a lot of knocking noise[s], loud, like somebody kicking something or slamming 
doors." About ten minutes later, the neighbor heard "a lot of noise" and "a lot of 
people getting excited." He then heard a loud muffler sound and observed 
headlights in the road. A short time later, at about 1:30 a.m., McDonald showed 
up at a co-worker's house and was visibly upset.  The co-worker testified that, 
although McDonald did stay at his house from time to time, this was the first time 
McDonald had showed up so late. In addition, the morning after the murder, 
Whitehead showed up to work at the Sonic with a scratch under one of his eyes 
and a limp.  He began acting strange and lied to his manager about the source of 
the injuries, claiming that he fell at work.  Several days later, he walked out of 
work during a shift and told his manager that he's "got problems" and was "about 
to move to Aiken."  We find this evidence of guilt, independent of Cannon's 
confession, compelling.   
Beyond the independent evidence of guilt, McDonald gave a confession that was 
entirely consistent with Cannon's confession.  McDonald's confession detailed 
going to the restaurant with Whitehead and Cannon, purchasing a ski mask and 
gloves from Wal-Mart, arriving at Victim's home, kicking in the door, hitting 
Victim repeatedly in the body and head with a baseball bat, and stealing various 
items from Victim's home.  The properly admitted evidence at trial aligns with the 
details McDonald provided in his confession.  In addition to the corroboration of 
the purchase at Wal-Mart, part of a purple latex glove was found at the crime 
scene. Victim's girlfriend further testified that Victim kept a baseball bat at his 
home, which investigators also found at the crime scene.   
Given the extensive evidence of guilt, we conclude that the Bruton violation was 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Schneble, 405 U.S. at 431 (finding a 
Bruton violation to be harmless error when the "details of petitioner's [confession]
were internally consistent, were corroborated by other objective evidence, and 
were not contradicted by any other evidence in the case").4 
4 Although we find the error in this case harmless, we take this opportunity to 
repeat our cautionary warning from almost three decades ago when we "urge[d] the 
[S]tate to carefully consider all the available alternatives before deciding to try co-
defendants jointly." State v. Bellamy, 293 S.C. 103, 106, 359 S.E.2d 63, 65 (1987), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Torrence, 305 S.C. 45, 69 n.5, 406 S.E.2d 
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IV. 
 
We conclude that the admission of Cannon's redacted confession violated 
McDonald's Confrontation Clause rights.  However, in light of the overwhelming 
evidence of guilt, we determine that that the error in this case was harmless beyond 
a reasonable doubt. We affirm the court of appeals as modified. 
 
 
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED. 
 
TOAL, C.J., PLEICONES, BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur. 
                                                                                                                             
 315, 328 n.5 (1991). "While we realize there will be circumstances in which a 
joint trial will be the best route to follow, the decision to pursue this route should 
be made only after giving due deliberation to the inherent problems, such as 
redacted statements, which arise from joint trials."  Id. 
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JUSTICE KITTREDGE:  We granted Ricky Rhame's petition for a writ of 
certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision in Rhame v. Charleston County 
School District, 399 S.C. 477, 732 S.E.2d 202 (Ct. App. 2012).  We are presented 
with a legal question—whether an Appellate Panel of the Workers' Compensation 
Commission has the authority to entertain motions for rehearing.  We hold an 
Appellate Panel of the Commission, on review of a single commissioner's decision, 
has such authority, and we reverse the contrary decision of the court of appeals.  
We remand to the court of appeals for consideration of Rhame's appeal from the 
Commission.       
I. 
Rhame filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits.  The single commissioner 
found the claim compensable.  Respondent sought review, and the matter was 
heard by an Appellate Panel of the Commission.  The Appellate Panel reversed, 
denying the claim.  Rhame filed a motion for rehearing before the Appellate Panel.  
He did not file his notice of appeal until after the Appellate Panel denied his 
motion for rehearing.  The notice of appeal was filed more than thirty days after 
the Appellate Panel's initial denial of the claim.
The court of appeals dismissed Rhame's appeal because the notice of appeal was 
not filed within thirty days from the date the Appellate Panel denied his claim.
Rhame, 399 S.C. at 482–83, 732 S.E.2d at 205.  The court of appeals held that 
motions for rehearing are not permitted before the Commission on review of a 
single commissioner's decision.  Id.
We granted Rhame's petition for a writ of certiorari, which asked this Court to 
reverse the court of appeals and reinstate his appeal. 
II. 
Whether the legislature has granted the Commission, on review of a single 
commissioner's decision, the authority to entertain motions for rehearing is a 
question of statutory interpretation, and this Court reviews that question de novo.  
Bone v. U.S. Food Serv., 404 S.C. 67, 75, 744 S.E.2d 552, 556 (2013).  Rhame 
argues section 1-23-380(1) of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) grants him the 
right to seek rehearing before the Appellate Panel of the Commission following 
review of a single commissioner's decision.  We agree.   
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III. 
 
A. 
 
Section 1-23-380(1) provides: 
 
Proceedings for review are instituted by serving and filing notice of 
appeal as provided in the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules within 
thirty days after the final decision of the agency or, if a rehearing is 
requested, within thirty days after the decision is rendered.  Copies of 
the notice of appeal must be served upon the agency and all parties of 
record. 
 
(emphasis added). 
 
"'The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the 
intention of the legislature.'"  Ranucci v. Crain, 409 S.C. 493, 500, 763 S.E.2d 189, 
192 (2014) (quoting Sloan v. Hardee, 371 S.C. 495, 498, 640 S.E.2d 457, 459 
(2007)). "'When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is 
no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to 
its literal meaning.'"  Id. (quoting Sloan, 371 S.C. at 498, 640 S.E.2d at 459). "In 
interpreting a statute, '[w]ords must be given their plain and ordinary meaning 
without resort to subtle or forced construction to limit or expand the statute's 
operation.'"  Id. (quoting Sloan, 371 S.C. at 499, 640 S.E.2d at 459). 
 
The plain language of section 1-23-380(1) indicates that the legislature, by 
including the phrase "if a rehearing is requested," intended to allow motions for 
rehearing before all administrative agencies that are governed by the 
Administrative Procedures Act (APA).  See Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 132, 
276 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1981) (noting that the APA was enacted "to provide uniform 
procedures before State Boards and Commissions" (emphasis added)).  Section 1-
23-380 is titled "Judicial review upon exhaustion of administrative remedies."  See 
Lindsay v. S. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 258 S.C. 272, 277, 188 S.E.2d 374, 376 
(1972) ("It is 'proper to consider the title or caption of an act in aid of construction 
to show the intent of the legislature.'" (quoting Univ. of S.C. v. Elliott, 248 S.C. 
218, 221, 149 S.E.2d 433, 434 (1966))).  The plain and common sense 
interpretation envisions an expansive view of exhaustion of potential remedies 
before the agency and thus promotes judicial economy and avoids unnecessary 
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appeals. A timely motion for rehearing falls squarely within the remedies 
envisioned in section 1-23-380.1 See Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) 
("Exhaustion gives an agency an opportunity to correct its own mistakes with 
respect to the programs it administers before it is haled into . . . court." (quotations 
omitted)).  Moreover, there is no statute that is in conflict with section 1-23-380 
that precludes a motion for rehearing to an Appellate Panel, including sections 42-
17-50 and -60. 
While recognizing the right to file a motion for rehearing to an Appellate Panel, we 
do not construe the "if a rehearing is requested" language to mandate the filing of a 
motion for rehearing.  This is consistent with general administrative law.  See 73 
C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure § 131 (2014) ("[I]f it is apparent 
from the statutes governing administrative proceedings that a motion for rehearing 
is optional, it need not be pursued in order to exhaust administrative remedies."). 
B. 
We further note that the agency promulgated regulations support our construction 
of section 1-23-380. Chapter 67 of the South Carolina Code of Regulations 
contains myriad regulations applicable to the Commission.  For example, Articles 
2 and 6 of Chapter 67 address the processing of a claim up to the hearing before a 
single commissioner.  Motions practice before a single commissioner is limited, as 
merit-based motions are disallowed. S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-215 (2012).2 
1  We recognize that many courts across the country follow the general rule that 
"[a]n administrative agency ordinarily has the inherent authority or power to 
reconsider, or to reopen, a prior decision provided that such occurs within a 
reasonable time after the decision was made."  2 Am. Jur. 2d Administrative Law § 
362 (2014) (compiling cases); see also In re Crawford, 205 S.C. 72, 95, 30 S.E.2d 
841, 850 (1944) (Stukes, J., concurring) (finding that the Commission has the 
"inherent and implied power" to grant rehearing).  Given the clear statutory 
authority allowing a motion for rehearing, we do not reach the question of an 
administrative tribunal's inherent authority. 
2 We find a review of Article 2 compels the conclusion that it is primarily 
applicable to the filing and processing of a claim through the hearing before the 
single commissioner, often referred to as the "jurisdictional commissioner" by the 
Commission.  Regulation 67-215 is plainly limited to motions to the single 
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Conversely, the procedure for review by an Appellate Panel of a single 
commissioner's decision is contained in Article 7 of Chapter 67, entitled "review 
and hearing." 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-701(A) (2012).  An Appellate Panel is 
considered the ultimate fact-finder. See Houston v. Deloach & Deloach, 378 S.C. 
543, 551, 663 S.E.2d 85, 89 (Ct. App. 2008) ("The final determination of witness 
credibility and the weight assigned to the evidence is reserved to the appellate 
panel. Where there are conflicts in the evidence over a factual issue, the findings 
of the appellate panel are conclusive." (citations omitted)).3 
Unlike Article 2, there is no provision in Article 7 disallowing merits-based 
motions to the Appellate Panel.  Moreover, regulation 67-712 authorizes "higher 
court review" and expressly incorporates "Rule 203(b)(6), SCACR."  Rule 
203(b)(6), SCACR is titled "Appeals from administrative tribunals" and provides 
the notice of appeal shall be served "within thirty (30) days after receipt of the 
decision. If a timely petition for rehearing is filed with the administrative tribunal, 
the time to appeal for all parties shall be stayed and shall run from receipt of the 
decision granting or denying that motion."  This rule, expressly incorporated into 
the regulations of the Commission, clearly envisions a procedure for seeking 
rehearing before the Appellate Panel. 
IV. 
We hold Rhame's motion for rehearing to the Appellate Panel was proper and 
stayed the time for serving the notice of appeal for thirty days from receipt of the 
commissioner.   See 8 S.C. Code Ann. Regs. 67-215(G) (2012) ("The jurisdictional 
commissioner may consider the motion after the opposing party has had ten days 
notice of the motion and shall grant or deny the relief requested." (emphasis 
added)). The dissent misapprehends the reach of Article 2 in general and 
Regulation 67-215 in particular.  As much as the dissent wants to create a conflict 
between the statute and the regulations, none exists.   
3  As noted, at the Commission, it is the Appellate Panel that makes the final 
agency decision and compensability determination.  Moreover, and while perhaps 
paradoxical, credibility and factual determinations are also made by the Appellate 
Panel, not the single commissioner.  It is for this reason that a motion for rehearing 
is proper before the Appellate Panel and not the single commissioner.  
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decision denying the motion.  We remand to the court of appeals to consider 
Rhame's appeal.4  
 
 
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
 
TOAL, C.J., BEATTY and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., dissenting 
in a separate opinion. 
  
4  We overrule all cases that disallow a motion for rehearing to the full 
Commission or Appellate Panel. 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES:  I respectfully dissent as in my view the Appellate Panel 
of the Workers' Compensation Commission has no authority to entertain petitions 
for rehearing. I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' dismissal of 
Claimant's appeal as untimely. 
I. Section 1–23–380(1)
The majority holds that the "if rehearing is requested" language from § 1–23– 
380(1), a statute outlining the procedures for obtaining judicial review of an 
administrative decision, confers upon the Appellate Panel the authority to entertain 
petitions for rehearing. I disagree. 
In my opinion, the majority's reliance on Lark v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 276 S.C. 130, 276 
S.E.2d 304 (1981) is misplaced.  The uniformity addressed in Lark clarified that 
the standard of review applicable to a decision of the Workers' Compensation 
Commission is substantial evidence, rather than the previous "any evidence"
standard. 276 S.C. at 135–37, 276 S.E.2d 306–07.  Lark therefore established 
uniformity in the judicial review of an agency decision; it did not however 
establish procedures applicable in the practice before every administrative agency.  
Accordingly, Lark does not support the majority's broad interpretation of § 1–23– 
380. 
Further, the majority does not explain how its interpretation of § 1–23–380 can be 
read in consonance with agency–specific statutes and regulations setting forth 
individualized procedures in the practice before different agencies. See S.C. Code 
Ann. § 58-27-2150 (1976) (granting the Public Service Commission the authority 
to rehear its decisions), S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 28-24 (West 2012) (conferring the 
same authority upon the Department of Consumer Affairs), S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 
61-72.806 (West 2012) (doing the same for the Department of Health and 
Environmental Control).  In contrast to these provisions, there is no statute or 
regulation granting the Commission the authority to entertain petitions for 
rehearing. Cf. S.C. Code Ann. Reg. 67-215 (West 2012) (stating the Workers'
Compensation Commission "will not address a motion involving the merits").5  In 
light of these agency–specific statutes and regulations, I decline to interpret § 1– 
23–380(1) in a manner that renders these provisions as surplusage.  See CFRE, 
5 I can find no support for the majority's position that Regulation 67–215 applies 
only to proceedings before the single commissioner.   
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L.L.C. v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011) 
(declining to interpret a statute in a manner that rendered as surplusage any word, 
clause, sentence, provision, or part since the Legislature "obviously intended [the 
statute] to have some efficacy; or the [L]egislature would not have enacted it into 
law"). Since the Commission is a creature of statute and has only that authority 
granted to it by the Legislature, and since there is no statute or regulation granting 
the Commission the authority to entertain petitions for rehearing, I would hold the 
Court of Appeals properly dismissed Claimant's appeal.  See Med. Soc'y of S.C. v. 
Med. Univ. of S.C., 334 S.C. 270, 275, 513 S.E.2d 352, 355 (1999) ("An agency 
created by statute has only the authority granted to it by the legislature."). 
II. Regulation 67–712
The majority ascribes significance to the reference to Rule 203(b)(6), SCACR, in 
Regulation 67–712 to support its holding that the Commission has the authority to 
entertain petitions for rehearing. I disagree.
The reference to Rule 203(b)(6), SCACR, in Regulation 67–712 reflects an 
acknowledgment that judicial review of a decision by the Workers' Compensation 
Commission is now had at the Court of Appeals, rather than at the circuit court as 
was the case before the 2006 amendment to § 1–23–380.  Like § 1–23–380(1), 
Rule 203(b)(6) simply acknowledges that some administrative agencies permit 
petitions for rehearing. When an agency has the authority to entertain such 
petitions, and rehearing is sought at that agency, the time for seeking judicial 
review of that agency's decision is not triggered until rehearing is granted or 
denied. Here, there is no grant of authority for the Commission to entertain 
petitions for rehearing. Therefore, the time for filing a notice of appeal began after 
the Appellate Panel denied the claim.  See S.C. Code Ann. § 42–17–60 (Supp. 
2014) (establishing thirty days as the time within which a party may seek review of 
a Commission's decision to the Court of Appeals).  The Court of Appeals therefore 
properly dismissed the appeal since it was not filed within thirty days from the date 
the Appellate Panel denied the claim.  Consequently, I would affirm the Court of 
Appeals' decision to dismiss Claimant's appeal as untimely. 
III. Conclusion 
The Legislature has not granted the Commission the authority to entertain petitions 
for rehearing. The Commission therefore has no such authority, and the Court of 
Appeals properly determined the timeline for seeking judicial review of the 
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Commission's decision was triggered when the Appellate Panel issued its decision.  
I would therefore affirm the Court of Appeals' dismissal of Claimant's appeal since 
it was not filed within thirty days of the Appellate Panel's decision.
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
RE: 	  Limited Certificate of Admission for Judge Advocates 
ORDER 
Pursuant to Article V, § 4, of the South Carolina Constitution, the South 
Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) are amended as follows: 
 
(1) 	 Rule 427, SCACR, is added as shown in the attachment to this 
order. 
 
(2) Rule 410(h)(2), SCACR, is amended by adding the following: 
(D) Limited Member - Rule 427 (Limited Certificate of 
Admission for Judge Advocates). Any person who holds a limited 
certificate under Rule 427, SCACR. 
(3) 	 Rule 410(j)(8), SCACR, is amended to read: 
(8) Limited Member. No fee shall be required for a person 
holding a limited certificate under Rule 415 (Limited Certificate of 
Admission for Retired and Inactive Attorney Pro Bono Participation 
Program), SCACR, or Rule 427 (Limited Certificate of Admission for 
Judge Advocates), SCACR. The license fee for all other persons 
holding a limited certificate shall be $260.  
(4) 	 Rule 410(k)(8), SCACR, is amended to read: 
(8) Limited Member. No fee shall be required for a person 
holding a limited certificate under Rule 415 (Limited Certificate of 
Admission for Retired and Inactive Attorney Pro Bono Participation 
Program), SCACR, or Rule 427 (Limited Certificate of Admission for 
Judge Advocates), SCACR. The additional license fee for a person 
holding a limited certificate under Rules 405 (Limited Certificate of 
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 Admission for In-House Counsel) and 414 (Limited Certificate of 
Admission for Clinical Law Program Teachers), SCACR, shall be 
$20. 
These amendments shall be effective immediately. 
 
 
 
s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
April 20, 2015 
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 RULE 427 

LIMITED CERTIFICATE OF ADMISSION FOR JUDGE ADVOCATES 
 
(a) Purpose.  The purpose of this rule is to allow judge advocates to obtain a 
limited certificate to practice law to represent authorized clients before a court or 
administrative tribunal in South Carolina as part of legal assistance services 
authorized by 10 U.S.C. § 1044 and applicable military regulations. 
 
(b) Definitions.   
 (1) Judge Advocate: an officer of the Judge Advocate General’s Corps 
of the Army or the Navy; an officer of the Air Force or the Marine Corps who is 
designated as a judge advocate; or a commissioned officer of the Coast Guard 
designated for special duty (law). (10 U.S.C. §801(13)). 
 (2) Administrative Tribunal: the South Carolina Administrative Law 
Court or other administrative agency of this State or its political subdivisions 
which determines contested cases. 
 (3) Authorized Clients:  military personnel on active duty with the 
Armed Forces of the United States in the enlisted grades E-1 through E-4, and their 
dependents, who are under substantial financial hardship, to the extent that such 
representation is permitted by the supervisory staff judge advocate or commanding 
officer. Other military personnel and their dependents who are under substantial 
financial hardship may be represented if approved by the applicable Judge 
Advocate General or his or her designee. A dependent shall only include those 
persons eligible for legal assistance services under the applicable service 
regulation. 
(c) Qualifications for Admission.  An attorney may be granted a limited 
certificate to practice law in South Carolina if he or she: 
 (1) is at least twenty-one (21) years of age; 
 (2) is a person of good moral character; 
(3) has received a JD or LLB degree from a law school which was 
approved by the Council of Legal Education of the American Bar 
Association at the time the degree was conferred; 
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 (4) has been admitted to practice law in the highest court of another state, 
the District of Columbia, or a territory of the United States; 
(5) is a member in good standing in each jurisdiction where the attorney 
is admitted to practice law; 
(6) has not been disbarred or suspended from the practice of law and is 
not the subject of any pending disciplinary proceeding in any other 
jurisdiction; 
(7) is a judge advocate serving on active duty either indefinitely or for a 
period of six (6) months or more, and is assigned to a military installation, 
unit or office located in South Carolina; and,  
(8) has completed an Essentials Series Course administered by the South 
Carolina Bar. This course may be completed either live or on-line.  The 
South Carolina Bar shall make this course available to judge advocates 
seeking admission under this rule either without a fee or for a minimal fee.  
(d) Application. An attorney desiring a limited certificate of admission to 
practice law under this rule shall file an application with the Clerk of the Supreme 
Court. This application shall be on a form approved by the Supreme Court. The 
application shall be accompanied by a certificate of good standing from each 
jurisdiction in which the attorney has been admitted to practice law, and a 
statement on official letterhead signed by the supervisory staff judge advocate or 
other supervisory judge advocate in the grade of 0-5 or above stating that the 
attorney meets the requirements of (c)(7) above.  No filing fee shall be required for 
the application.
(e) Reference to the Committee on Character and Fitness.  Any questions 
concerning the fitness or qualifications of the attorney may be referred by the 
Supreme Court to the Committee on Character and Fitness for a hearing and 
recommendation. 
(f) Confidentiality. The confidentiality provisions of Rule 402(n), SCACR, 
shall apply to all files and records of the Committee on Character and Fitness, and 
the Clerk of the Supreme Court relating to a limited certificate to practice law 
under this rule. 
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(g) Scope of Representation and Adherence to Rules.  An attorney issued a 
limited certificate under this rule may represent an authorized client before a court 
or administrative tribunal of this State in a civil action or proceeding.  This rule 
does not authorize representation before a court or tribunal in a criminal case.  In 
providing representation, the attorney shall comply with the rules of practice and 
procedure applicable to the court or tribunal, and shall adhere to the South Carolina 
Rules of Professional Responsibility and any other ethical rules applicable to the 
matter. The attorney shall also comply with the continuing legal education 
requirements of Rule 408, SCACR, and the failure to do so may result in 
administrative suspension under Rule 419, SCACR.  No license fee or assessment 
shall be charged to these attorneys under Rules 410 and 411, SCACR. The attorney 
shall not accept any form of compensation from an authorized client. 
(h) Notice of Appearance to Be Filed.  In every case in which the attorney 
appears, the attorney shall complete and file a notice of appearance form.  This 
form shall be approved by the Supreme Court.  In addition to any other information 
which may be required by the form, this form shall contain the name of the 
attorney; the name, address and telephone number of the attorney's military unit or 
legal office; and information showing that a determination has been made that the 
client is an authorized client under this rule. 
(i) Unauthorized Practice.  If an attorney granted a limited certificate engages 
in the practice of law in excess of that permitted by this rule, the attorney may be 
subject to discipline under Rule 413, SCACR, a revocation of the limited 
certificate by the Supreme Court, or being held in contempt of the Supreme Court 
for engaging in the unauthorized practice of law. 
(j) Misconduct and Incapacity.  Except as otherwise provided in this rule, the 
procedures provided by Rule 413, SCACR, shall be used for resolving allegations 
that the attorney has committed ethical misconduct or suffers from a physical or 
mental condition which adversely affects the attorney's ability to practice law. If, 
however, the Supreme Court imposes a definite suspension or disbarment, or 
transfers the attorney to incapacity inactive status, the limited certificate shall be 
terminated as provided in (k) below. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court, the 
lawyer may not seek to be readmitted under this rule or any other rule until the 
period of suspension has expired or, in the case of disbarment, until five years after 
the date of the opinion or order imposing the disbarment.  
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(k) Termination of Certificate.  The limited certificate of admission to practice 
law shall terminate if: 
(1) The limited certificate is revoked by the Supreme Court under (i) 
above. 
(2) The attorney is admitted to practice law in South Carolina under Rule 
402, SCACR, or is granted another limited certificate of admission to 
practice law under this or any other rule, or is licensed as a foreign legal 
consultant under Rule 424, SCACR. 
(3) The attorney is suspended or disbarred in this or any other 
jurisdiction. This does not include interim suspensions under Rule 17 of the 
Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413, SCACR, 
or a similar rule in another jurisdiction.  For an administrative suspension 
under Rule 419, SCACR, the attorney may seek reinstatement as provided in 
that rule. 
(4) The attorney is no longer on active duty, is no longer assigned to 
perform legal assistance duties, or is no longer assigned to a military 
installation, unit or office located in South Carolina. 
(l) Resignation.  Any request by an attorney licensed under this rule shall be 
processed as provided by Rule 409, SCACR. 
(m) Surrender of Certificate.  Upon the termination of the limited certificate or 
acceptance of a resignation, the attorney granted the limited certificate shall 
immediately surrender the certificate to the Clerk of the Supreme Court.  The 
failure to immediately surrender the certificate upon termination or the acceptance 
of a resignation may subject the attorney to discipline under Rule 413, SCACR, or 
to being held in contempt of the Supreme Court. 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

The State, Respondent, 
 
v. 
 
Rakeem D. King, Appellant. 
 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213405 
Appeal From Charleston County 
J. C. Nicholson, Jr., Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5313 

Heard November 18, 2014 – Filed April 22, 2015 

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 
REMANDED 
Jenny L. Barwick, of Greenville, and Chief Appellate 
Defender Robert Michael Dudek, of Columbia, for 
Appellant. 
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson, Senior 
Assistant Deputy Attorney General Deborah R.J. Shupe, 
both of Columbia; and Solicitor Scarlett Anne Wilson, of 
Charleston, for Respondent.
FEW, C.J.:  Rakeem D. King appeals his convictions for attempted murder, armed 
robbery, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  
We find the trial court erred by (1) charging the jury that a specific intent to kill is 
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not an element of attempted murder and (2) allowing hearsay testimony as to the 
number of shots King fired.  These errors require reversal of King's conviction for 
attempted murder.  However, we find the court's errors caused King no prejudice 
as to his convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm during the 
commission of a violent crime, and we affirm those convictions.  We remand for a 
new trial for attempted murder. 
I. Facts and Procedural History 
On November 26, 2010 at 4:06 a.m., a customer called Yellow Cab requesting to 
be picked up at 1808 Carlton Street in North Charleston.  The operator recorded 
the customer's telephone number from Yellow Cab's caller identification.  At 4:11 
a.m., Yellow Cab dispatched Dario Brown to that location.  Brown was familiar 
with the Carlton Street area because his aunt had lived at 1809 Carlton—directly 
across the street from 1808 Carlton. 
Brown testified he expected the customer to be his cousin because he lived in the 
area, and Brown had picked him up at the same location and time of night in the 
past. Brown saw a person coming from the yard of 1809 Carlton—his aunt's old 
house, which was abandoned at the time.  When the person got into the back of the 
cab, Brown realized it was not his cousin.  Brown turned around, looked the man 
in the face, and asked why he came from the abandoned house.  Brown and the 
man began to argue about whether the man lived at 1809 Carlton. 
Brown testified he drove toward the dead-end of Carlton Street so he could make a 
U-turn and take the man to his destination.  Brown stated that before he reached 
the end of the street, "I heard his cocking a pistol.  When I looked back he had 
raised the gun to my face and told me to give him the money."  Brown handed the 
man "give away money."  The man told Brown it was not enough, however, and 
pointed the gun at the back of Brown's head.  Brown testified, "I made an attempt 
to move [the gun] with my elbow and my forearm trying to move it out of the way 
telling him he doesn't have to rob me."  The man demanded more money.  Brown 
opened the door to the cab and had "one foot on the ground and [his] other foot on 
the brake." Brown testified the gun was "[s]till placed at the back of my neck."  
With his hands over his head, Brown "gave him a look in his eye" and testified the 
man "looked as if he was going to shoot me."  When Brown tried again "to move 
the gun away from [his] face," the man shot Brown in the arm.   
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Brown testified he jumped from the cab and ran toward the dead-end of Carlton 
Street. "I look[ed] back and I [saw] him in pursuit behind me"—"maybe two steps 
behind me."  Brown explained he tried to jump over a fence at the end of the street, 
"but my arm gave out so I kind of flipped head first over [the fence] and landed on 
my back."  Brown testified, "When I hit the ground . . . he was . . . holding the gate 
with one hand and reaching over with his other hand with the gun in it."  Brown 
testified the man fired another shot at him.  Brown crawled behind a van, and the 
man fired more shots.  Brown testified the man was "[s]till outside the gate saying 
that he is not going to shoot me anymore if I just give him the money."  Brown 
stated, "I want to say in all I heard maybe six or seven shots but I can't be exact." 
Brown eventually called the police from his cell phone.  Officer Jennifer Butler 
testified she arrived at 4:21 a.m. and saw Brown's empty cab "that had run into a 
pole on the side of the road." Shortly thereafter, she made contact with Brown and 
called emergency medical services.  She did not see anyone else.  After Brown was 
taken to the hospital, Officer Butler and a detective walked door-to-door "in the 
immediate area . . . to speak with the people to see if they heard anything or 
happened to see anything." Over King's hearsay objection, Officer Butler testified 
she "learned there was more than one shot"—"[a]pproximately three or four shots" 
were fired. 
Kelly Murphy—a crime scene technician—testified she found "a .25 auto shell 
casing" in the cab. Murphy also testified she and four other officers searched the 
Carlton Street area for two hours and found no other shell casings.  Murphy 
conceded on cross-examination that "if there were shells there [I] needed to find 
them," and "if there were any of those anywhere [I] would have collected those."   
Three days later, officers showed Brown a photographic lineup without a 
photograph of King, and Brown did not identify anyone from the lineup.  Officers 
then traced the number recorded by the Yellow Cab operator and learned the phone 
was registered to a person who had given a falsified address.  Using DMV records, 
officers located King, who had the same date of birth and a very similar address to 
those used to register the phone. Officers then prepared a second photographic 
lineup with a photograph of King, and Brown identified King as the man who shot 
and robbed him.
The jury found King guilty of attempted murder, armed robbery, and possession of 
a firearm during the commission of a violent crime.  The trial court sentenced King 
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 to thirty years in prison for armed robbery and five years for possession of a 
firearm, with those sentences to run consecutive.  For the attempted murder 
conviction, the trial court sentenced King to ten years in prison, concurrent with 
the other sentences.   
 
 
II. Jury Charge 
 
King argues the State must prove as an element of attempted murder that King 
acted with specific intent to kill Brown.  We agree, and thus we find the trial court 
erred when it charged the jury, "A specific intent to kill is not an element of 
attempted murder but it must be a general intent to commit serious bodily harm."  
 
Section 16-3-29 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2014) defines attempted 
murder: "A person who, with intent to kill, attempts to kill another person with 
malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, commits the offense of attempted 
murder."  Because the crime is defined by statute, we first look to the language of 
the statute to determine what the Legislature intended the elements of the crime to 
be—including the level of intent required. See Guinyard v. State, 260 S.C. 220, 
227, 195 S.E.2d 392, 395 (1973) ("The power of the Legislature to declare what 
acts shall constitute crimes . . . includes the power to make the commission of the 
act criminal without regard to the intent or knowledge of the accused . . . .  
Therefore, whether knowledge and intent are necessary elements of a statutory 
crime must be determined from the language of the statute . . . ." (citing State v. 
Manos, 179 S.C. 45, 49-50, 183 S.E. 582, 584 (1936))).  
 
If the language of a statute is "unambiguous and conveys a clear meaning," the 
court must determine the intent of the Legislature exclusively from that language, 
and other "rules of statutory interpretation are not needed."  State v. Elwell, 403 
S.C. 606, 612, 743 S.E.2d 802, 806 (2013) (internal punctuation omitted).  The 
phrase "with intent to kill" in section 16-3-29 does not clearly indicate what level 
of intent the Legislature meant to require the State to prove because the word 
"intent" can mean anything from purpose to negligence.  See State v. Jefferies, 316 
S.C. 13, 18, 446 S.E.2d 427, 430 (1994) ("The required [intent] for a particular 
crime can be classified into a hierarchy of culpable states of mind in descending 
order of culpability, as purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence.").  
Therefore, we must look beyond the words of the statute and use our rules of 
statutory construction to determine what the Legislature intended.  Cf. State v. 
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Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 33, 667 S.E.2d 728, 733 (2008) ("Whenever possible, 
legislative intent should be found in the plain language of the statute itself.  Where 
the statute's language is plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite 
meaning, the rules of statutory interpretation are not needed . . . ."). 
Section 16-3-29 was enacted in 2010 as part of the Omnibus Crime Reduction and 
Sentencing Reform Act.  See Act No. 273, 2010 S.C. Acts 1947. Before 2010, our 
courts held attempt crimes require the State to prove the defendant had specific 
intent to complete the attempted crime.  See, e.g., State v. Sutton, 340 S.C. 393, 
397, 532 S.E.2d 283, 285 (2000) (stating "[a]ttempt is a specific intent crime" and 
"[t]he act constituting the attempt must be done with the intent to commit that 
particular crime" (first alteration in original) (quoting 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal Law
§ 176 (1998))); State v. Thompson, 374 S.C. 257, 262, 647 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Ct. 
App. 2007) ("A person is guilty of attempted armed robbery if the person has a 
specific intent to commit armed robbery."); State v. Nesbitt, 346 S.C. 226, 231, 550 
S.E.2d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2001) ("Attempt crimes are generally ones of specific 
intent such that the act constituting the attempt must be done with the intent to 
commit that particular crime.  In the context of an 'attempt' crime, specific intent 
means that the defendant consciously intended the completion of acts comprising 
the [attempted] offense. In other words, the completion of such acts is the 
defendant's purpose." (citations omitted)).   
In Sutton—decided before the Legislature enacted section 16-3-29—our supreme 
court faced the question "whether attempted murder [was] an offense in this state."  
340 S.C. at 396, 532 S.E.2d at 285. To answer the question, the court compared 
the elements of assault and battery with intent to kill (ABWIK) and the elements of 
attempted murder.  340 S.C. at 396-98, 532 S.E.2d at 285-86.  Though the court 
"decline[d] to recognize a separate offense of attempted murder," 340 S.C. at 398, 
532 S.E.2d at 286, it stated, "Attempted murder would require the specific intent to 
kill," and "specific intent means that the defendant consciously intended the 
completion of acts comprising the [attempted] offense." 340 S.C. at 397, 532 
S.E.2d at 285.
With this history of our courts requiring the State to prove specific intent as an 
element of attempt crimes, the Legislature chose to include the phrase "with intent 
to kill" in section 16-3-29. The Legislature is presumed to know how the terms 
and phrases it uses in a statute have been interpreted in the past. See State v. 
Bridgers, 329 S.C. 11, 14, 495 S.E.2d 196, 197-98 (1997) ("The General Assembly 
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is presumed to be aware of the common law, . . . and where a statute uses a term
that has a well-recognized meaning in the law, the presumption is that the General 
Assembly intended to use the term in that sense." (citation omitted)); see also
Shirley's Iron Works, Inc. v. City of Union, 403 S.C. 560, 570, 743 S.E.2d 778, 783 
(2013) (stating "this Court must presume the legislature knew of and contemplated 
[existing legislation] in enacting [an act]"); Grier v. AMISUB of S.C., Inc., 397 
S.C. 532, 536, 725 S.E.2d 693, 696 (2012) (stating "Congress presumably knows 
and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the 
body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to 
the judicial mind" (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Wigfall v. 
Tideland Utils., Inc., 354 S.C. 100, 111, 580 S.E.2d 100, 105 (2003) ("The 
Legislature is presumed to be aware of this Court's interpretation of its statutes."); 
State v. McKnight, 352 S.C. 635, 648, 576 S.E.2d 168, 175 (2003) ("There is a 
presumption that the legislature has knowledge of previous legislation as well as of 
judicial decisions construing that legislation when later statutes are enacted 
concerning related subjects."); see also Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 320 (2012) ("[W]ords undefined 
in a statute are to be interpreted and applied according to their common-law 
meanings."). 
The Legislature's use of the phrase "with intent to kill," considered in light of our 
courts' prior rulings that specific intent is required for attempt crimes—particularly 
the supreme court's statement in Sutton, "Attempted murder would require the 
specific intent to kill"1—indicates the Legislature intended to require the State to 
prove the specific intent to kill as an element of attempted murder.  See also
Elwell, 403 S.C. at 612, 743 S.E.2d at 806 (stating "penal statutes will be strictly 
construed against the state"); Jeffrey F. Ghent, Annotation, What Constitutes 
Attempted Murder, 54 A.L.R.3d 612, 622 (1973) (describing "the general rule that 
the . . . elements of . . . attempted murder [include] a specific intent to commit 
murder" (footnote omitted)).  
The State argues, however, the Legislature intended to codify the common law 
crime of ABWIK when it enacted section 16-3-29, and because a specific intent to 
kill was not an element of ABWIK, the Legislature did not intend to require a 
specific intent to kill as an element of attempted murder.  To support its argument 
that section 16-3-29 is a codification of ABWIK, the State points to the following 
1 340 S.C. at 397, 532 S.E.2d at 285.
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language in the Omnibus Crime Reduction and Sentencing Reform Act: "The 
common law offenses of [ABWIK and others] are abolished," and, "[W]herever in
the 1976 Code reference is made to [ABWIK], it means attempted murder as 
defined in Section 16-3-29." Act No. 273, 2010 S.C. Acts 1949-50.   
We disagree with the State's argument.  First, the statement that ABWIK is 
"abolished"—with no reference to the abolished crime being codified as attempted 
murder—is inconsistent with the State's position.  Second, we find the Legislature 
included the statement "[ABWIK] . . . means attempted murder" to avoid any 
confusion as to how the new crime of attempted murder affects the operation of 
other statutes that contain the phrase "assault and battery with intent to kill."  For 
example, subsection 17-30-70(A)(1) of the South Carolina Code (2014) authorizes 
a circuit judge to sign "an order authorizing or approving the interception of wire, 
oral, or electronic communications" for the investigation of certain crimes, 
including "assault and battery with intent to kill."  The language relied on by the 
State simply makes clear that a judge may sign such an order for the investigation 
of attempted murder even though that crime is not specifically listed in the 
subsection. Similarly, section 17-19-40 of the South Carolina Code (2014) 
provides that in indictments for certain crimes such as murder and ABWIK, "when 
the crime is charged to have been committed with a deadly weapon . . . , there shall 
be a special count in the indictment for carrying concealed weapons."  The 
language relied on by the State simply makes clear that section 17-19-40 also 
applies to attempted murder.    
We find the Legislature intended to require the State to prove specific intent to 
commit murder as an element of attempted murder, and therefore the trial court 
erred by charging the jury that attempted murder is a general intent crime. 
III. Hearsay Testimony 
King argues the trial court erred in admitting Officer Butler's testimony that she 
"learned there was more than one shot" and "[a]pproximately three or four shots" 
were fired. We agree the testimony contained hearsay and should have been 
excluded. 
After Officer Butler described going door-to-door to speak to neighbors, the 
assistant solicitor asked, "Did you make contact with anyone in the area?"  She 
initially answered, "[W]e were able to speak to I believe it was two people and 
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they were able to confirm . . . ."  At that point, King objected on the basis of 
hearsay, and the trial court sustained the objection.  The assistant solicitor 
rephrased the question, asking, "What did you learn as you [talked to those 
neighbors]?" King again objected, but the trial court overruled the objection, 
stating, "I'll -- she can testify to what she learned."  Officer Butler answered, "I 
learned there was more than one shot"—"[a]pproximately three or four shots."   
Officer Butler did not see or hear any shots, and thus she did not have personal 
knowledge of the number of shots fired.  Rather, her knowledge was based 
exclusively on statements made to her by neighbors when she walked the area after 
Brown was taken to the hospital.  By testifying to the number of shots fired, 
Officer Butler testified to the content of the neighbors' out-of-court statements.  
The State offered her testimony to prove the truth of the neighbors' statements.  
Therefore, her testimony as to the number of shots fired was hearsay.  See Rule 
801(c), SCRE ("'Hearsay' is a statement, other than one made by the declarant 
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the 
matter asserted."). 
The State argues the testimony was not hearsay because, "Testimony of a police 
officer regarding [her] conclusions from an investigation is not hearsay."  The State 
contends "Officer Butler merely testified about what her investigation . . . 
revealed," and, "She did not repeat any specific statements made by the people she 
interviewed." The State relies on State v. Kromah, 401 S.C. 340, 737 S.E.2d 490 
(2013) and State v. Weaver, 361 S.C. 73, 602 S.E.2d 786 (Ct. App. 2004), aff'd as 
modified, 374 S.C. 313, 649 S.E.2d 479 (2007).  Neither opinion supports the 
State's position.   
In Kromah, two State witnesses "testif[ied] regarding the actions they took as a 
result of hearsay statements made by the three-year-old Child."  401 S.C. at 354, 
737 S.E.2d at 497. Kromah asserted one witness "was permitted to testify that 
following her conversation with the child, she turned the information over to law 
enforcement," and the second witness—the arresting officer—"was permitted to 
testify that following his conversation with the child, he arrested petitioner the next 
day." Id.  Kromah argued the trial court erred in admitting the officer's testimony 
because it revealed the content of the child's hearsay statements, and thus the live 
testimony itself "constituted inadmissible hearsay."  401 S.C. at 355, 737 S.E.2d at 
498. 
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The supreme court found the testimony was not hearsay.  Id.  The court stated the 
officer "testified in detail about his investigative process and the numerous 
individuals he spoke to, including the Child, and that he made his decision to arrest 
Kromah based on all of this information."  Id.  The court found the officer's
"testimony referencing his interview of the Child . . . was only one part of the 
information he recited in his investigative process leading up to his [decision] to 
arrest Kromah, and we find his testimony . . . did not repeat what the Child said to 
him."  Id.
This case is distinguishable from Kromah. There, the officer had an entire 
"investigative process" on which to base his decision to make an arrest, and the 
child's out-of-court statements were "only one part of the information" the officer 
obtained in that investigation. Id.  Because the officer might have relied on any 
part of his investigation in deciding to arrest Kromah, his testimony did not 
necessarily reveal the content of the child's statements.  Officer Butler, however, 
had only the neighbors' out-of-court statements on which to rely as the basis of her 
testimony.  Therefore, her testimony was based exclusively on hearsay statements, 
and she necessarily revealed the content of those statements when she testified as 
to the number of shots fired. 
The State also relies on Weaver, where an investigating officer testified, "All of the 
witnesses that I talked to led me to believe . . . [the defendant] was the only suspect 
that really was involved . . . ." 361 S.C. at 85, 602 S.E.2d at 792.  Weaver argued 
the testimony was inadmissible because it "was based on what witnesses told" the 
officer, and thus was hearsay because it revealed the content of their out-of-court 
statements. Id.  This court found the testimony was not hearsay for two reasons.  
First, we stated the officer "never repeated statements made to him."  361 S.C. at 
86, 602 S.E.2d at 792.  Second, we explained that the "testimony was in response 
to the questions asked on cross-examination as to why [the officer] did not perform
a gunshot residue test on everyone at the crime scene."  361 S.C. at 86, 602 S.E.2d 
at 792-93. Therefore, the evidence was not offered to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted, but "was offered to explain this part of his investigation."  361 S.C. at 86, 
602 S.E.2d at 793. 
The Weaver court found the officer's live testimony was not hearsay because it was 
not offered to prove the truth of the out-of-court statements, and the Kromah court 
found the officer's live testimony was not hearsay because it did not necessarily 
reveal the content of out-of-court statements.  But both courts recognized live 
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testimony—such as Officer Butler's—can be hearsay under certain circumstances.  
Numerous other courts have reached the same conclusion.  In Weems v. State, 501 
S.E.2d 806 (Ga. 1998), for example, the Supreme Court of Georgia considered an 
objection to testimony from an "investigating detective [who] testified . . . that a 
police canvass of the area where the shooting took place resulted in police learning 
'that a possible suspect was Fernando.'"  501 S.E.2d at 808. The court found the 
officer's live testimony was hearsay because the officer "testif[ied] . . . to what 
other persons related to [him] during the investigation."2  Id.
Similarly, in United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189 (11th Cir. 2005), the Eleventh 
Circuit considered an objection to testimony from an officer who "testified that his 
investigation . . . 'revealed' [the identity of] the gunman."  432 F.3d at 1206. The 
court held the officer's live testimony was hearsay "even though [the testimony 
did] not explicitly paraphrase the words of others, [because] the only conceivable 
explanation for how [the officer] discovered this information is through listening to 
the statements of others." Id. (citing United States v. Shiver, 414 F.2d 461, 463 
(5th Cir. 1969) (finding a detective's testimony that his investigation "revealed" a 
certain car was stolen was "pure hearsay, since he could not have known the facts 
of his own knowledge")). 
The Tenth Circuit addressed a situation similar to ours in United States v. Hinson, 
585 F.3d 1328 (10th Cir. 2009).  A police detective "testified . . . she began 
investigating [another person] based on her suspicion that he was selling drugs."  
585 F.3d at 1336. She explained the other person's "initial interview . . . 
confirm[ed her] earlier investigation that [his] source of supplies was a person by 
the name of Kevin," and "the 'Kevin' she had heard about earlier was Kevin 
Hinson, the defendant." Id. (first alteration in original).  The Tenth Circuit found 
the detective's live testimony "violated the hearsay rules."  Id.  Like this court did 
in Weaver, the Tenth Circuit analyzed the purpose for which the government 
offered the evidence. 585 F.3d at 1336-37.  The court noted, "Testimony which is 
not offered to prove the truth of an out-of-court statement, but is offered instead for 
relevant context or background, is not considered hearsay."  585 F.3d at 1336 
2 Weems was decided under former Official Code of Georgia Annotated section 24-
3-2. Id.  Section 24-3-2 was part of the Georgia Code that defined hearsay.  See
Momon v. State, 294 S.E.2d 482, 484 (Ga. 1982) (explaining "Code [section] 38-
302 [predecessor to section 24-3-2] should be understood not as an exception to the 
rule against hearsay but as an explanation of what is not hearsay"). 
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(quoting United States v. Becker, 230 F.3d 1224, 1228 (10th Cir. 2000)).  The 
court then found "the only purpose [the detective]'s hearsay testimony served was 
to [prove] . . . that Hinson was, in fact, [the] drug supplier."  585 F.3d at 1337. The 
court held, "That purpose is impermissible, and this evidence should not have been 
admitted."  Id.
Here, the State had no purpose for offering Officer Butler's testimony except to 
prove the truth of the neighbors' statements that more than one shot was fired.  The 
State did not argue at trial or on appeal that her testimony on this subject was 
necessary to explain her conduct or to give context to other testimony.  Cf. State v. 
Brown, 317 S.C. 55, 63, 451 S.E.2d 888, 894 (1994) (explaining "an out of court 
statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a 
government investigation was undertaken" and "these statements were not entered 
for their truth but rather to explain why the officers began their surveillance");3 see 
also Caprood v. State, 338 S.C. 103, 111, 525 S.E.2d 514, 518 (2000) (stating 
"officers' statements . . . were similar to those in Brown in that . . . the officers were 
explaining their actions . . . and the statements were not offered for their truth").  
The State appears to concede it offered the testimony to prove the number of shots 
King fired by arguing "Officer Butler merely testified about what her investigation 
. . . revealed." We find Officer Butler's testimony was hearsay because it was 
based exclusively on what other witnesses told her—thereby necessarily revealing 
the content of out-of-court statements—and the State offered her testimony to 
prove the truth of those statements. Therefore, the trial court erred by admitting 
the testimony.
IV. Prejudice and Harmless Error 
The State contends the trial court's errors did not prejudice King and were harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Tapp, 398 S.C. 376, 389, 728 S.E.2d 468, 
475 (2012) ("Whether an error is harmless depends on the circumstances of the 
particular case. No definite rule of law governs this finding; rather, the materiality 
and prejudicial character of the error must be determined from its relationship to 
the entire case. Error is harmless when it could not reasonably have affected the 
3 Brown was tried before we adopted the Rules of Evidence.  See Rule 1103(b), 
SCRE ("These rules shall become effective September 3, 1995.").  However, our 
definition of hearsay did not change with the adoption of the Rules.  See Rule 801, 
SCRE, "Notes" (stating "[s]ubsection (c) is consistent with South Carolina law").  
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result of the trial." (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); 398 S.C. at 
389-90, 728 S.E.2d at 475 ("Engaging in this harmless error analysis, we . . . 
question . . . whether beyond a reasonable doubt the trial error did not contribute to 
the guilty verdict."); State v. Belcher, 385 S.C. 597, 611, 685 S.E.2d 802, 809 
(2009) ("Errors, including erroneous jury instructions, are subject to harmless error 
analysis."); State v. Weston, 367 S.C. 279, 288, 625 S.E.2d 641, 646 (2006) ("The 
improper admission of hearsay is reversible error only when the admission causes 
prejudice."). 
We find the trial court's errors prejudiced King as to his attempted murder 
conviction, affected the result of his trial on that charge, and thus were not 
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.  One of the key issues at trial was whether 
King continued to shoot at Brown after they exited the cab.  Brown testified "six or 
seven" shots were fired, all but one of which were fired outside the cab.  However, 
there are specific facts in this case that could lead a jury to find King fired only one 
shot. In particular, Brown was dispatched to Carlton Street at 4:11 a.m.  He 
testified it took him "[a] minute, two minutes" to get there.  Officer Butler testified 
she arrived on the scene at 4:21 a.m. Officers searched the area for hours and 
found only one shell casing.  Under these circumstances, it seems highly unlikely 
King could have robbed and shot Brown in the cab, chased him down Carlton 
Street while shooting at him, and then retrieved all the shell casings in the dark 
before Officer Butler arrived.   
Brown's testimony that he repeatedly pushed King's gun away supports the 
inference that when King shot Brown in the cab, he did so in a struggle and did not 
intend to kill Brown. It is more difficult to imagine, however, that King could 
have chased Brown down Carlton Street while shooting at him unless he 
specifically intended to kill Brown. Thus, the State presented a stronger case for 
attempted murder from the shots fired during the chase.  These circumstances 
made Officer Butler's testimony as to the number of shots fired critical to the 
State's ability to prove King continued to shoot at Brown after they exited the cab, 
and thus made her testimony important to the State's ability to prove King guilty of 
attempted murder.   
Therefore, we find Officer Butler's inadmissible testimony as to the number of 
shots King fired affected the jury's verdict on attempted murder, and we cannot say 
that either the admission of the evidence or the erroneous jury charge are harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
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We find beyond a reasonable doubt, however, the trial court's errors did not 
prejudice King as to his armed robbery and possession of a firearm convictions 
because the errors did not affect the result of his trial on those charges.  Obviously, 
the jury charge on attempted murder did not affect King's conviction for armed 
robbery. As to the armed robbery itself, there is no evidence contradicting Brown's 
testimony that King shot Brown in the cab during an attempt to rob him.  Brown 
testified he handed "give away money" to King while they were still in the cab.  
Thus, King has not shown that either the jury charge on attempted murder or the 
admission of Officer Butler's testimony as to the number of shots fired had any 
effect on the armed robbery or the possession of a firearm charges.  Because King 
failed to demonstrate prejudice from the trial court's errors as to those convictions, 
we affirm. See State v. Black, 400 S.C. 10, 16-17, 732 S.E.2d 880, 884 (2012) 
("To warrant reversal [for the admission of evidence], an error must result in 
prejudice to the appealing party."); Gaines, 380 S.C. at 31, 667 S.E.2d at 732 ("To 
warrant reversal, a trial court's . . . jury charge must be both erroneous and 
prejudicial to the defendant."). 
 
V. Other Issues On Appeal 
 
We affirm as to King's remaining issues pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the 
following authorities: 
 
1. As to the trial court's charge to the jury that "[m]alice may be inferred . . . when 
the deed is done with a deadly weapon": see Belcher, 385 S.C. at 612, 685 S.E.2d 
at 810 (holding "where evidence is presented that would reduce, mitigate, excuse 
or justify a homicide (or assault and battery with intent to kill) caused by the use of 
a deadly weapon, juries shall not be charged that malice may be inferred from the 
use of a deadly weapon"); id. ("The permissive inference charge concerning the 
use of a deadly weapon remains a correct statement of the law where the only issue 
presented to the jury is whether the defendant has committed [attempted] 
murder . . . .").  We find no basis for reducing, mitigating, excusing, or justifying 
King's conduct.  See State v. Smith, 391 S.C. 408, 415, 706 S.E.2d 12, 16 (2011) 
("Because [the defendant] was acting unlawfully, he was not entitled to an accident 
charge."). 
 
2. As to the trial court allowing the State to publish King's detention center phone 
call: see Rule 403, SCRE (stating "[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded 
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 if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice"); State v. Gray, 408 S.C. 601, 616, 759 S.E.2d 160, 168 (Ct. App. 2014) 
("Prejudice that is 'unfair' is distinguished from the legitimate impact all evidence 
has on the outcome of a case."); id. ("Unfair prejudice does not mean the damage 
to a defendant's case that results from the legitimate probative force of the 
evidence; rather it refers to evidence which tends to suggest decision on an 
improper basis." (citation omitted)); State v. Dickerson, 395 S.C. 101, 116, 716 
S.E.2d 895, 903 (2011) ("The admission of evidence is within the [trial] court's 
discretion and will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."); 
State v. Lee, 399 S.C. 521, 527, 732 S.E.2d 225, 228 (Ct. App. 2012) ("A trial 
court has particularly wide discretion in ruling on Rule 403 objections."). 
 
3. As to the trial court's admission of King's cell phone records: see State v. 
Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 527, 765 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2014) (stating "the Fourth 
Amendment is not triggered unless a person has an actual and reasonable 
expectation of privacy"); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 
2582, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220, 229 (1979) ("This Court consistently has held that a person 
has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to 
third parties."); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1624, 48 
L. Ed. 2d 71, 79 (1976) ("This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth 
Amendment does not prohibit the obtaining of information revealed to a third party 
and conveyed by him to Government authorities, even if the information is 
revealed on the assumption that it will be used only for a limited purpose and the 
confidence placed in the third party will not be betrayed."). 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
We find the trial court erred in charging the jury that a specific intent to kill is not 
an element of attempted murder and in admitting Officer Butler's hearsay 
testimony.  Because we find these errors prejudiced King as to his conviction for 
attempted murder, we reverse and remand for a new trial.  We affirm King's 
convictions for armed robbery and possession of a firearm.   
 
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 
 
LOCKEMY, J., concurs. 
 
WILLIAMS, J., concurs in result only. 
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KONDUROS, J.:  The State appeals the circuit court's decision granting Walter 
M. Bash's motion to suppress drug evidence relating to charges against him for 
trafficking in cocaine greater than 400 grams and trafficking in cocaine base.  We 
reverse and remand.  
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FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Officers in the Berkeley County Sheriff's Office received an anonymous tip that 
drug activity was occurring in the backyard of a particular home on Nelson Ferry 
Road in Moncks Corner. Narcotics officer Sergeant Lee Holbrook and his partner, 
Sergeant Kimberly Milks, were in the area and decided to go to the location.  
According to the officers' testimonies at the suppression hearing, they went to the 
property to speak with the owner and investigate the tip.  Sergeant Milks testified 
she radioed to other officers in the area that she and Sergeant Holbrook were going 
to the location. She also testified she and Sergeant Holbrook put on their hats and 
vests marked "Sheriff" prior to approaching the scene.   
Sergeant Holbrook testified he and Sergeant Milks drove to the property and 
observed the home was surrounded by a chain link fence.1  They turned onto Shine 
Bash Road, a public road beside the house that provided a view into the backyard.  
Sergeant Holbrook testified they observed several people along with an old shed in
a grassy area immediately outside the fence.  A black truck, owned by Bash, was 
parked there as well. 
Sergeant Holbrook pulled his vehicle, an unmarked brown Ford Expedition, off the 
road into the grassy area behind Bash's truck.  As he and Sergeant Milks exited 
their vehicle, he observed one of the men drop a baggie containing a white 
powdery substance. He testified another man exited the passenger side of Bash's 
truck and fled toward the adjacent wooded area.  That individual was chased by the 
other officers present while Sergeant Holbrook remained at the scene with the 
other individuals.  Bash exited the driver's side of his truck, and Sergeant Holbrook 
asked him to step to the tailgate area of the vehicle where the others were gathered.  
Sergeant Holbrook stated that upon the return of the other officers, law 
enforcement proceeded to arrest the man observed dropping the powdery 
substance. Sergeant Holbrook testified he looked in the window of Bash's truck to 
ensure no other occupants were hiding. When he looked through the window, he 
1 Photographic exhibits depict the front gate being chained and padlocked.  
However, the photographs provided were taken approximately two years after the 
subject incident. Neither party was able to confirm at oral argument if the gate was 
locked at the time of police entry onto the property. 
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saw scales of the type typically used in weighing drugs and a large plastic baggie 
containing a white powdery substance. 
At trial, Bash moved to suppress the drug evidence found in his vehicle, arguing 
officers entered and searched the curtilage of the property without a warrant and 
without meeting any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement.  The State 
contended the grassy area outside the fence was not within the curtilage of the 
property but was an open field, thereby falling without the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment. The State further argued even if the grassy area beyond the fence 
was within the curtilage of the property, police had the right to enter to conduct a 
"knock and talk"2 and their further actions were justified once they observed one of 
the men drop what appeared to be drugs and another fled the scene. 
The circuit court granted Bash's motion to suppress the drug evidence seized from 
his truck. The circuit court concluded "the tip was not enough to roll up in the 
backyard solely to search for drugs. And there's no reasonable interpretation of the 
officers' testimony other than that's why they were there."  This appeal followed. 3 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"In criminal cases, appellate courts sit to review errors of law only, and are 
therefore bound by the trial court's factual findings unless clearly erroneous."  State 
v. Robinson, 410 S.C. 519, 526, 765 S.E.2d 564, 568 (2014).  "Because the 
admission of evidence is within the sound discretion of the trial court, appellate 
courts should not reverse the decision of the trial court absent an abuse of
discretion."  Id.  "An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's ruling is 
based on an error of law or, when grounded in factual conclusions, is without 
evidentiary support."  State v. Hawes, 411 S.C. 188, 191, 767 S.E.2d 707, 708 
(2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "On appeals from a motion to suppress 
2 "A knock and talk . . . is a procedure used by police officers to investigate a 
complaint where there is no probable cause for a search warrant.  The police 
officers knock on the door, try to make contact with persons inside, and talk to 
them about the subject of the complaints."  State v. Dorsey, 762 S.E.2d 584, 588 
n.6 (W.Va. 2014) (alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
3 The issue of whether Bash had an expectation of privacy on someone else's
property was briefly raised to the circuit court but was never fully developed and 
was never ruled upon by the circuit court.  The issue is not raised on appeal.   
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based on Fourth Amendment grounds, [an appellate court] applies a deferential 
standard of review and will reverse if there is clear error."  State v. Adams, 409 
S.C. 641, 647, 763 S.E.2d 341, 344 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
"However, [an appellate court] reviews questions of law de novo."  Id. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
The State contends the circuit court erred in finding the police conduct in this case 
violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches and 
seizures and suppressing the drug evidence against Bash.4  We agree. 
4 After reviewing the record, it is unclear whether the circuit court ruled on 
whether the grassy area at issue was part of the curtilage of the subject property.  
While such a finding was arguably implicit in its ultimate decision, the circuit 
court indicated "[t]his isn't an open field's question."  Additionally, the circuit court 
failed to address any of the Dunn factors used in a curtilage analysis. U.S. v. Dunn, 
480 U.S. 294, 301 (1987) ("[C]urtilage questions should be resolved with 
particular reference to four factors: the proximity of the area claimed to be
curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure surrounding 
the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps taken by the 
resident to protect the area from observation by people passing by.").  Finally, the 
circuit court cited to a non-curtilage Fourth Amendment case, State v. Taylor, in 
ultimately suppressing the drug evidence against Bash.  401 S.C. 104, 106-13, 736 
S.E.2d 663, 664-67 (2013) (finding an investigatory stop and frisk of a defendant 
riding a bicycle on a public road based on an anonymous tip and police 
observations did not violate the Fourth Amendment).  Because we conclude the 
conduct of police in this case did not violate the Fourth Amendment even if the 
grassy area was part of the curtilage, we decline to address the curtilage issue.  See 
Spartanburg Cnty. Dep't of Soc. Servs. v. Little, 309 S.C. 122, 126, 420 S.E.2d 
499, 502 (1992) (declining to address the appellant's additional reasons for reversal 
when the first issue compelled reversal and was dispositive of the appeal); Ringer 
v. Graham, 286 S.C. 14, 20, 331 S.E.2d 373, 377 (Ct. App. 1985) ("Because a new 
trial is granted, discussion of the other issues raised by the [appellants] is 
unnecessary."). Our remaining analysis assumes arguendo that police entered the 
curtilage of the property. 
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The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures." 
U.S. Const. amend. IV.  "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all contact 
between police and citizens, but is designed to prevent arbitrary and oppressive 
interference by enforcement officials with the privacy and personal security of 
individuals."  State v. Corley, 383 S.C. 232, 240, 679 S.E.2d 187, 191 (Ct. App. 
2009) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd as modified, 392 S.C. 125, 708 
S.E.2d 217 (2011). "We should construe the Fourth Amendment in a manner 
which will conserve public interests as well as the interests and rights of individual 
citizens." Covey v. Assessor of Ohio Cnty., 777 F.3d 186, 194 (4th Cir. 2015) 
(alteration omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"A policeman may lawfully go to a person's home to interview him. . . .  In doing 
so, he obviously can go up to the door. . . . A police officer without a warrant is 
privileged to enter private property to investigate a complaint or a report of an 
ongoing crime." State v. Wright, 391 S.C. 436, 444, 706 S.E.2d 324, 328 (2011) 
(alterations by court) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Wright, police received an anonymous tip dogfighting was occurring at a 
particular location. Id. at 440, 706 S.E.2d at 325. Because the tip came in close to 
time for a shift change, officers were instructed to stay and congregate in a church
parking lot near the subject property.  Id.  Two deputies drove past the location and 
observed lights shining next to a mobile home located at the address as well as a 
number of vehicles.  Id. Law enforcement then paired up in several cars and drove 
to the address to investigate further. Id. at 440, 706 S.E.2d at 326. The deputies 
initially had their car headlights off as they drove down the private road toward the 
mobile home.  Id. When deputies turned their lights on, they saw people and dogs 
running away from the mobile home, a portable dogfighting ring, and other indicia 
of dogfighting. Id. at 440-41, 706 S.E.2d at 326. 
In finding the initial entrance of the officers onto the property did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court of South Carolina stated: 
[T]he deputies responded to an anonymous tip by first 
driving by the residence on a public road.  From this 
road, deputies observed a large number of vehicles at the 
mobile home and saw spotlights shining next to the 
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mobile home.  These observations were not subject to 
any Fourth Amendment protection because they were
knowingly exposed to the public.  Moreover, these 
observations would give a reasonable police officer in the 
deputies' position cause to go forward.  However, even 
absent these observations, the police had the 
investigative authority to approach the front door of the 
mobile home in order to investigate the anonymous tip. 
. . . If the deputies could properly drive up the dirt 
driveway to get to the front door, then their observations 
of the dogfighting pit and fleeing people and dogs did not 
exceed their investigative authority.
Id. at 445, 706 S.E.2d at 328 (emphasis added). 
In the present case, officers' observations of several individuals in the backyard at 
the subject property corroborated the anonymous tip.  This is less corroboration 
than the lights and cars observed in Wright. Nevertheless, Wright indicates police 
had investigatory authority to enter the property, even in the absence of 
corroboration, and go to the front door to investigate the tip. 
Here, police did not approach the front door but instead drove into the grassy area 
behind the residence where they had observed the individuals.  While no South 
Carolina cases have addressed this point, the Fourth Circuit has adopted the 
position police may bypass the front door of a residence and proceed to the 
backyard or other entrance for a knock and talk provided they have reason to 
believe the person they are attempting to contact will be found there. 
"The textual touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness."  Alvarez v. 
Montgomery Cnty., 147 F.3d 354, 358 (4th Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "When applying this basic principle, the [United States] Supreme Court 
has consistently eschewed bright-line rules, instead emphasizing the fact-specific 
nature of the reasonableness inquiry." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"In line with this reasonableness approach, [the Fourth C]ircuit has permitted law 
enforcement officers to enter a person's backyard without a warrant when they 
have a legitimate law enforcement purpose for doing so."  Id. An agent does not 
exceed "the scope of his legitimate purpose for being there by walking around to 
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the back door when he was unable to get an answer at the front door."  Id. (internal 
quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, an officer may "bypass the front door (or 
another entry point usually used by visitors) when circumstances reasonably 
indicate that the officer might find the homeowner elsewhere on the property."
Covey, 777 F.3d at 193.5 
In Alvarez, police received a complaint of underage drinking at a party.  147 F.3d 
at 356. Officer Romack approached the front door of the residence to make 
contact with the homeowner, but, before knocking, another officer noticed a sign 
indicating the party was in the back of the house. Id. at 356-57. The officers 
proceeded to the backyard, where Officer Romack asked to speak with the host and 
encountered an underage drinker whom he asked for identification.  Id. at 357. In 
determining whether the warrantless entry into the backyard violated the Fourth 
Amendment, the Fourth Circuit stated: 
The officers' entry into the backyard satisfied the Fourth 
Amendment's reasonableness requirement.  They were 
responding to a 911 call about an underage drinking party 
and, based on the alcohol containers and the awkwardly 
parked cars, believed they had found the party.  They 
entered the Alvarezes' property simply to notify the 
homeowner or the party's host about the complaint and to 
ask that no one drive while intoxicated.  Thus, like the 
agents in Bradshaw[6], the officers in this case had a 
5 "Other circuits likewise have found that the Fourth Amendment does not 
invariably forbid an officer's warrantless entry into the area surrounding a 
residential dwelling even when the officer has not first knocked at the front door."  
Alvarez, 147 F.3d at 358.
6 In U.S. v. Bradshaw, law enforcement officers entered defendant's property to ask 
him about an abandoned car near his property.  490 F.2d 1097, 1100 (4th Cir. 
1974). After knocking on the front door of the residence and receiving no 
response, one officer proceeded to the rear of the residence to knock on a back 
door. Id. at 1099. While en route, the officer noticed Bradshaw's truck exuded a 
strong odor of moonshine.  Id. He peered through a crack in the closed, rear, 
swinging doors of the truck and saw multiple gallon jugs containing a white liquid 
which was in fact moonshine.  Id. at 1099-100. The court stated: "[T]he agents 
had a legitimate reason for this incursion unconnected with a search of such 
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legitimate reason for entering the Alvarezes' property 
unconnected with a search of such premises. . . .  In
furtherance of this purpose, they obviously could 
approach the front door in an attempt to contact the 
Alvarezes. And in light of the sign reading "Party In 
Back" with an arrow pointing toward the backyard, it 
surely was reasonable for the officers to proceed there 
directly as part of their effort to speak with the party's 
host. 
Id. at 358-59 (second alteration by the court) (citations and internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
In this case, Sergeant Holbrook and Sergeant Milks testified they saw several 
individuals in the backyard as they arrived at the property.  That observation 
provided a reasonable basis for believing they would find the homeowner in the 
backyard. Therefore, we conclude entering the grassy area behind the house to 
investigate the anonymous tip did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
Finally, the circuit court concluded the officers' stated intent of going to the 
property simply to talk to the homeowner was implausible and therefore police 
entry onto the property violated the Fourth Amendment as a warrantless search.7 
However, the Supreme Court of South Carolina has recognized "[t]he Fourth 
Amendment's concern with reasonableness allows certain actions to be taken in 
premises directed against the accused.  They were clearly entitled to go onto 
defendant's premises in order to question him concerning the abandoned vehicle 
near his property. Furthermore, we cannot say that [the officer] exceeded the 
scope of his legitimate purpose for being there by walking around to the back door 
when he was unable to get an answer at the front door."  Id. at 1100 (footnote 
omitted).  Nevertheless, the court ultimately suppressed because the moonshine 
was not in the officer's plain view and the warrantless search of the truck was not 
necessitated by any other circumstances.  Id. at 1101-04.
7 We recognize findings of credibility are generally left to the circuit court.  See 
Gowdy v. Gibson, 381 S.C. 225, 233, 672 S.E.2d 794, 798 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(acknowledging while this court is not bound by credibility determinations, "we 
generally defer to the findings of the trial judge in that regard") aff'd 391 S.C. 374, 
706 S.E.2d 495 (2011). 
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certain circumstances, whatever the subjective intent." Wright, 391 S.C. at 444, 
706 S.E.2d at 328 (internal quotation marks omitted).  "Moreover, a police officer's 
subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment 
analysis." State v. Vinson, 400 S.C. 347, 352, 734 S.E.2d 182, 184 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  "'[E]venhanded law enforcement is best 
achieved by the application of objective standards of conduct, rather than standards 
that depend upon the subjective state of mind of the officer.'"  Wright, 391 S.C. at 
443, 706 S.E.2d at 327 (quoting Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)). 
"An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual 
officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify 
[the] action." State v. Herring, 387 S.C. 201, 210, 692 S.E.2d 490, 494 (2009) 
(alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
We conclude the circuit court's injection of the officers' subjective intent into its 
analysis was an error of law.8  While the circuit court may have found the officers' 
underlying intent was to search the premises, that intent is not impermissible  
provided the officers had a reasonably objective basis for their actual conduct.  
Sergeant Holbrook and Sergeant Milks testified they entered the grassy area 
because they saw several individuals there, they exited their vehicles, and they 
began to speak to the individuals based on an anonymous tip.9  Therefore, we are 
8 We share the learned circuit court's apparent concern regarding the lack of 
specificity as to the source and manner of conveyance of the anonymous tip in this 
case. Additionally, we recognize the use of the knock and talk procedure is 
sometimes pretextual.  Nevertheless, we confine our review to the relevant case 
law and specific facts in the record before us.  
9 The record is unclear as to how many officers were ultimately on the scene, when 
those officers arrived, or where they were located when Sergeant Holbrook and 
Sergeant Milks parked in the grassy area.  Sergeant Holbrook testified "quite a 
few" officers chased after the fleeing individual and Sergeant Milks testified they 
"let the other agents" know on the radio they were going to investigate this tip.  
Notably, in Wright, the opinion indicates that after receiving an anonymous tip, 
"law enforcement gathered at [a nearby] church, paired up in several cars, and 
drove to the address to investigate further."  391 S.C. at 440, 706 S.E.2d at 326. 
This suggests the number of officers involved is not dispositive of whether police 
contact is a knock and talk or a de facto search.  Additionally, Sergeant Milks 
testified the officers put on their vests and hats indicating they were part of the 
Sheriff's Office.  The circuit court found this conduct to be "suiting up" and that it 
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compelled to reverse the circuit court's finding the initial police entry onto the 
property violated the Fourth Amendment.10 
The circuit court did not reach the issues of whether the discovery of drug evidence 
in Bash's truck violated the Fourth Amendment (1) because no exigent 
circumstances existed or (2) because it was not in plain view.  However, because 
the suppression of the evidence could still be upheld based on these points, we will 
address them.  See Solanki v. Wal-Mart Store No. 2806, 410 S.C. 229, 235, 763 
S.E.2d 615, 618 (Ct. App. 2014) ("According to Rule 220(c), SCACR, an appellate 
court may affirm the lower court's judgment for any reason appearing in the record 
on appeal.").
"A warrantless search is justified under the exigent circumstances doctrine to 
prevent a suspect from fleeing or where there is a risk of danger to police or others 
inside or outside a dwelling. In such circumstances, a protective sweep of the 
premises may be permitted."  Herring, 387 S.C. at 210, 692 S.E.2d at 495 (citation 
omitted).  The plain view doctrine justifies seizure of evidence when the seizing 
officer is lawfully present at the place from which the evidence can be plainly 
viewed and the evidence's incriminating character is immediately apparent.  
Wright, 391 S.C. at 443, 706 S.E.2d at 327.   
Once in the backyard, Sergeant Holbrook observed an individual drop a baggie 
containing a white powdery substance. Next, the officers observed another 
individual jump out of Bash's truck and flee the scene.  The person did not simply 
leave or request to go but ran toward a wooded area.  These occurrences, coupled 
with the anonymous tip, gave officers probable cause to believe criminal activity 
was ongoing and the individuals might flee or otherwise attempt to evade law 
enforcement.  According to Sergeant Holbrook's testimony, in securing the scene, 
undercut the nature of this encounter as a knock and talk.  However, it is a more 
open policy for officers to identify themselves during such an investigatory 
encounter, and it is not unreasonable for officers to consider their own safety in 
such circumstances.   
10 Had officers entered the grassy area and demanded to search the individuals or 
their vehicles, it would have exceeded the parameters of a knock and talk type 
encounter. Likewise, had the individuals asked the officers to leave, any 
continuing police presence on the property would have gone beyond the scope of a 
knock and talk. 
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he looked inside the window of Bash's truck and observed drug weighing scales 
and cocaine. The photographic exhibits in the record support this testimony.  
Additionally, the incriminating nature of the evidence was readily apparent to an 
experienced narcotics officer like Sergeant Holbrook.  Because we have concluded 
Sergeant Holbrook was in a place he was lawfully permitted to be, the 
incriminating evidence was in plain view, and its criminal nature was readily 
apparent, we conclude its seizure did not violate the Fourth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Assuming arguendo, police entered the curtilage of the property at issue, we 
conclude that conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment prohibition against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. Police were permitted to enter the property to 
investigate an anonymous tip and had reason to believe they would locate the 
owner in the grassy area at the rear of the property.  Even if the officers hoped to 
find evidence of drug activity upon entry, that subjective intent does not convert 
the police conduct in this case into a Fourth Amendment violation.  Once at the 
scene, the actions of the individuals present gave officers probable cause to believe 
criminal activity was ongoing and that the suspects might flee or otherwise try to 
avoid police action.  Sergeant Holbrook's looking into Bash's truck window was 
permissible as part of a protective sweep of the area, and the drug evidence was in 
plain view and readily identifiable as contraband.  Consequently, we reverse the 
circuit court's grant of Bash's motion to suppress and remand this matter to the 
circuit court for trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED. 
THOMAS and GEATHERS, JJ., concur. 
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